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I Comments

I

Forget NAFTA: How the U.S. Can Obtain
Improved Protection of Copyrighted Goods
in Mexico Through the Creation of An Open
United States-Mexico Border
Dara Cox Bachman*
The United States, Mexico, and Canada ratified the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") eleven years ago,1 yet critics still
complain of continued high levels of immigration, slow progress on
environmental problems, weak enforcement of labor standards, a decline
in real wages, and increased transshipments through Mexico of illegal
drugs. The pirating of copyrighted goods in Mexico is also a constant3
among this list of problems as the pirating industry continues to swell in
Mexico despite NAFTA's restrictions. 4 The United States has been one
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.A., The University of Kansas, 2003. The author would like to thank
her husband for his never-ending patience and support and her parents for the inspiration
to never stop the pursuit of knowledge.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 17, 1992) U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R.
Doc. No. 103-0159 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, The Prospectsfor Deeper North American
Economic Integration:A U.S. Perspective, 195 C.D. HOWE INST. 1,4- 5(2004).
3. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report-Mex. (2004).
4. Id.
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of Mexico's biggest critics and has complained of its inability to comply
with the legislative standards established by NAFTA, yet the U.S. has
made few additional efforts beyond these complaints to aid Mexico in
coming into compliance. 5
Mexico's continued struggle with the harmonization of its policies
with those of Canada and the U.S. is most notably a result of Mexico's
continuing economic problems.6 Although Mexico's government has
been persistent in amending its statutes so that facially the nation appears
in compliance with NAFTA,7 a continual lack of capital has prevented
Mexico from implementing and enforcing the necessary changes.8
NAFTA's goal was to significantly raise levels of foreign direct
investment through the economic integration of the three nations. 9
However, eleven years after NAFTA was ratified, such drastic
improvements in Mexico's economy have not occurred.' ° Therefore, the
U.S. must realistically search for an alternative to boost Mexico's
economy if it ever hopes to see Mexico harmonize its laws in practice
with those of its northern neighbors."
This comment will demonstrate how an open U.S.-Mexico border
can make a lasting impact on the Mexican economy, thereby enabling
Mexico to improve all areas where it has failed to come into compliance
with NAFTA by looking specifically at the situation regarding copyright
law. Mexico has failed to offer the full protection afforded under the
copyright protection chapter of NAFTA, Chapter 17. The failures of the
copyright law will be used throughout the comment as an example of a
deficiency in Mexican law that has cost the U.S. hundreds of millions of

5. See, e.g., id. The U.S. approach has been to make self-evident suggestions of
what Mexico can do to make copyright protection more stringent and to hold bilateral
discussions regarding methods of improvement; however, the U.S. has offered no
assistance in implementing these suggestions. See id.
6. Hufbauer, supra note 2, at 8.
7. See, e.g., Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [Mexican Federal Copyright Law],
D.O., (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Federal Law]; Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor,
D.O., (Mar. 24, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Federal Law].
8. Hufbauer, supra note 2, at 8. Conversely, the U.S. economy has always enjoyed
a cyclical recovery throughout the years that has clouded the U.S.'s ability to understand
Mexico's economic problems. Id.
9. LYUBA ZARSKY & KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, INTERHEMISPHERIC RESOURCE CENTER,
NAFTA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN

MEXICO (2004), www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2004/040 1mexind-body.html. NAFTA
has performed poorly in terms of economic growth and "sustainable industrial
performance." Id.
10. Id.
11. Associated Press, Poverty Level Down, but Still Big Challenge for Mexico (July
28, 2004), at http://globalexchange.org/countries/mexico/2384.html. As President Fox
explained "Mexico is still very far away" from a situation of economic equality [with the
U.S.]." Id.
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dollars a year and yet the U.S. has done little more than file documents to
register complaints. Any plan by the U.S. to curb copyright piracy must
recognize that economic growth must be widespread so that the
government has financing to enforce the provisions 12and so that the
masses will be able to afford the inflated price of goods.
Part one of the comment will give a brief history of Mexican
copyright law. In part two, the comment will provide the reader with an
understanding of the state of copyright protection currently in Mexico.
Part three of the comment will explain how NAFTA has affected
Mexican copyright law and the various provisions available to all
Member Nation copyright holders. Part four of the comment will
speculate as to how an open border policy is a logical step for the U.S. to
take if it would like to change the situation in Mexico. This section will
further discuss what both the U.S. and Mexico must do to implement
such a change and some of the common concerns that have prevented the
U.S. from implementing such a change in the past. Moreover, this
comment will demonstrate how such efforts by the U.S. could have a
drastic influence on the specific area of copyright law in order to show
how such changes could affect all areas of NAFTA, so that NAFTA may
finally operate as intended.
I.

The History of Mexican Copyright Law

Mexico has steadily increased the protection afforded under its
federal copyright laws over the last 15 years.' 3 Mexican copyright law
remained unchanged for decades until 1991,14 when Mexico amended its
law in anticipation of the enactment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). Prior to this amendment, Mexico's government
gave little attention to copyright protection, in large part, because of a
widely held belief that stringent copyright protection would hamper
economic growth within Mexico. 15 Mexico, like many developing
nations, had a long-standing fear that strong intellectual property
protection would only benefit the developed
nations while raising
16
production costs within the developing nation.
12.

Joan Grillo, Pirates Sail the Virtual Seas, Bus. MEX., Sept. 2003, at

http://amcham.com.mx/publicaciones/business/septO3/pirates.html.
As one anonymous
counterfeiter explained, counterfeiting "allows [Mexicans] to get stuff for a price they
can afford. Most Mexicans are struggling economically, so they look for the cheapest
offer." Id.
13. See, e.g., 1991 Federal Law, supranote 7; 1997 Federal Law, supra note 7.
14. The 1963 Federal Copyright Law was not amended until almost thirty years later
with the 1991 Federal Law.
15.

See, e.g., Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., From the Yukon to the Yucatan, Houston's State

in the New North America, Hous. LAW. May/June 1992 at 29.
16.

Keith E.

Makus, Normative Concerns in the International Protection of

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

In the 1970s, Mexican President Luis Echeverria created a
protectionist regime later dubbed the "Echeverrian Wall."' 7 His regime
established protectionist tariffs, subsidies, and limits on foreign
investment in the hopes that domestic trade would be rejuvenated. 18 He
theorized that without copyright protection, production costs would be
reduced thereby eliminating external competition, since the copyrighted
goods of developed nations were necessarily sold at higher prices. 19 This
theory, at least internally, proved true because the majority of the people
of Mexico could not afford copyrighted goods, but would buy the
internally manufactured counterfeited goods.2 ° Initially this restructuring
did create a boom in Mexico's economy; however, in the long run,
developed nations stopped investing in Mexico once they realized that
their property rights were not being protected. 21 The loss in external
investment as a result of this faulty protectionist scheme placed Mexico
on the brink of bankruptcy in 1982.22
After the economic fall-out of 1982, Mexico dedicated itself to an
export-led economy that encouraged foreign investment and
technological discovery.23 The new system established an exchange of
goods that allowed Mexico to trade its low production costs for
employment, technology, and capital.24 Initially Mexico encountered
resistance from investing nations.2 5 In order to combat this resistance,
Mexico needed to give potential investing nations reassurance that it
would provide adequate copyright protection to their goods.26 In 1991,
Mexico put in place a new federal copyright law ("1991 Law"). The
Intellectual PropertyRights, 13 WORLD ECON. 387, 387 (1991).
17. See Murphy, supra note 15.
18. Intellectual Property Rights, Global Census, Global Conflict? 2 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
19. Id.
20. John Lannert, Mexican Labels Hope Trade Agreement Aids Piracy Battle,
BILLBOARD, Aug. 29, 1992.
21. Murphy, supra note 15, at 33. Aside from the theoretical errors of past
presidents, what little copyright protection Mexico did provide was insufficient because it
failed to cover major genres generally afforded copyright protection such as sound
recordings, computer programs, and video recordings. Id.; Ley Federal del Derecho de
Autor, D.O., (1963).
22. Murphy, supra note 15, at 29.
23. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No. 2275, REVIEW OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED
STATES- MEXICO RELATIONS (PHASE 1: RECENT TRADE AND INVESTMENT REFORMS
UNDERTAKEN BY MEXICO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES) (1990).
24. MICHAEL P. TODORO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 427-51

(1989).
25. Edwin F. Einstein, Promising Developments in Technology Transfer and
Intellectual Property Protection in Mexico, Newsl. of the Int'l Sec. (State Bar of Tex.),
Apr. 1990, at 13.
26. Id.
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1991 amendments to the copyright law were made in anticipation of the
signing of NAFTA and were the legislative beginning of regaining the
confidence of foreign investors.2 7
A.

The 1991 CopyrightLaw Amendments

The 1991 Law extended copyright protection to the works of
interpreters, performers, and producers of sound and video recordings as
well as sound recordings, movies, computer software, and computer
programs. 28 In addition, the amendments vested sole reproduction,
distribution, and rental rights to copyright owners for fifty years, 29 and
implemented harsher criminal and civil penalties for infringement.3 °
Prior to 1991, infringement penalties ranged from fines of fifty to 10,000
pesos and prison sentences of thirty days to six years. 3 1 The 1991 Law
increased the monetary fines to 500 days of minimum daily wage, or
$1,500, and prison terms from six months to six years.32 Investing
countries responded positively to the additional protections.33 For
example, the United States took Mexico off of the United States Trade
Representative's Special 30134 list of nations with the weakest copyright
protection. 35
Despite the statutory changes, Mexican law still failed to give
adequate protection for various reasons. First, the government agencies
did not have the tools to enforce the laws.36 Additionally, because
Mexico did not traditionally provide injunctions but maintained a lengthy

27. Id.
28. 1991 Federal Law, supra note 7.
29. Id.
30. Mariano Soni, Mexican Copyright Law, Bus. MEX., Oct. 1991, at 14.
31. Id.
32. 1991 Federal Law, supra note 7.
33. John Lannert, supra note 20. In 1992, an authorized cassette sold for $11.30
while a counterfeit cassette sold for $1.60. Mexico sold only fifty four million cassettes
in the official market in contrast to the seventy million cassettes that were sold in the
pirate market that year. Id.
34. The U.S. Trade Representative has the power to investigate unfair trade practices
in foreign nations under The United States Trade Act of 1974. Special 301 is a revision
to that Act which expands the U.S. Trade Representative's power to investigate and
sanction countries with high levels of counterfeited goods. See United States Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1978).
35. Christopher M. Gacek, U.S. Goals for Patent Protection in the GATT Trade
Talks, THE HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 31, 1991, available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/TradeandForeignAid/B0863.cfin. Mexico was previously placed on this list
because of the large volume of goods pirated in Mexico each year. Id.
36. Robert Holleyman, Software Piracy Abroad: Challenges and Opportunities,
1996 PLI SECOND ANN. INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. LAW 441. Most notably, Mexican
authorities must be able to perform unannounced searches of known copyright infringers.
Id.
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judicial process and provided relatively small damage awards, 37 a large
percentage of people were forced to rely upon the speedier criminal
remedies; however, criminal remedies did not compensate the copyright
owner and thus were of limited use to private parties.38 The U.S.
strongly urged Mexico to implement a system with higher civil penalties
and more severe criminal sanctions that would prevent future acts of
piracy.39
B.

The 1997 CopyrightLaw Amendments

Mexico continued to dedicate itself to improving its copyright
legislation and on March 24, 1997, Mexico enacted yet another new
federal copyright law ("1997 Law") in order to address some of the
above mentioned problems that still existed. 40 The 1997 Law defines
eligible works for protection generally as all original works that are able
to be reproduced 4 1 as soon as the works are recorded in a tangible
medium.4 2 The 1997 Law extends protection to any author that creates
the literary or artistic work 4 3 and expressly includes non-Mexican
authors. 4 Generally copyright protection continues for the life of the
author plus seventy five years,4 5 and gives the author exclusive control
over the use of the work.4 6 Additionally, authors retain some control
over the work even if it has been sold or licensed under a moral rights
provision.47 Remedies now include a maximum fine of 15,000 times the
daily minimum wage, or $45,000.48 Nevertheless, Mexican copyright
law continues to not include the following works: ideas, concepts,
formulas, methods, systems, processes, inventions, business plans,
sovereign banners, and symbols, isolate names or sentences, or texts of

37.

InternationalProperty Enforcement Issues to Play Major Role in NAFTA Talks,

Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1553 (Oct. 23, 1991).
38. Id.
39. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report-Mex. (1990).
40. 1997 Federal Law, supra note 7.
41. Id. art. 3.
42. Id. art. 5. These requirements closely mirror U.S. copyright requirements. See
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1976).
43. 1997 Federal Law, supra note 7, art. 12.
44. Id. art. 7.
45. Id. art. 29.
46. Id. arts. 24- 27. The right to exploit includes the right to copy, distribute, adapt,
perform and display the work. Id.
47. Id. arts. 19- 21; Alejandro Perez- Serrano F., Overview of Copyright Protection
in the United States and Mexico, 1997 COPYRIGHT NAT'L LAW CENTER FOR INTER-

AmERICAN FREE TRADE. Moral rights are defined as a set of prerogatives related to the
honor, prestige, and reputation of the author. Id.
48. 1997 Federal Law, supra note 7, art. 230.
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legislations.49 In sum, the 1997 Law, on its face, actually affords similar
protection to that of the U.S. law, if not more protection. 50 However,
enforcement shortcomings and judicial flaws have stunted the application
of Mexico's copyright law so that in practice it continues to fall short of
operating as effectively.5 1
II.

The Present State of Intellectual Property Protection in Mexico

Despite the great strides Mexico has taken in improving its
A lack of
copyright laws, Mexico remains a center for piracy.
53
of two
the
creation
by
presented
government action, the difficulties
5
5
54
government agencies to regulate the law, and bad timing are just some
of the reasons that the 1997 Law has failed to operate as intended. While
it is true that the Attorney General (PGR) is stepping up efforts to stop
copyright infringements by creating a special division which oversees
ot tooices
increase
nothing but intellectual property crimes, 56 such efforts
enforcement are not enough to keep up with the rate of increase in
piracy.5 7
Although the U.S. recognizes the efforts of the Mexican
government in amending the law,58 the efforts to enforce the law have
been insufficient. 59 In July of 2003, Mexico drafted another set of
49. Id. art. 14. It should be noted that these types of works do not receive protection
under the United States Copyright Law. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(1976).
50. Id.; 1997 Federal Law, supra note 7. Mexican Law provides greater protection
in several cases than the U.S. copyright law. See, e.g., id. at art. 19-21 (moral rights), 29
(75 year duration), 33 (assignment), 108 (facts in databases).
51. Fighting a Formidable Force: U.S. Commerce Drowning in Mexico's Piracy,
Austin American Statesman, Apr. 28, 1996, at 6G.
52. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, COMMERCIAL
PIRACY REPORT 2003-PRIORITY TERRITORIES (2003). Fifty eight percent of Mexicans
buy only pirated music making Mexico the tenth largest pirating market which cost the
U.S. market $445 Million in 2003; altogether, the U.S. lost $712 million in 2003 on
intellectual property infringements. U.S. Trade Rep. 2004 Special 301 Report Watch
List- Mex.
53. Fighting a FormidableForce, supranote 51, at 6G.
54. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report-Mex.(2004).
55. Id. The amendments fail to address the obligations of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, both of which Mexico is a
party to. Therefore, Mexico will need to further amend these amendments shortly. Id.
56. Grillo, supra note 12. In 2002, the PGR implemented seven times the amount of
raids from the year before resulting in a total of 1,488 raids. Id.
57. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, supra note 52.
The piracy rate was up to sixty eight percent in 2002 from sixty percent in 2001. Id.
58. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report, supra note 54. Prior legislation declaring
piracy to be an organized crime and creating the special intellectual property prosecutor
within the office of the Attorney General are two examples of steps the U.S. believes
indicate that Mexico's copyright law could be headed in the right direction. Id.
59. Id. In 2004, the U.S. included Mexico as one of its countries to watch for piracy.
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amendments to the federal copyright law to combat the billions of dollars
lost by foreign industry due to piracy in Mexico each year. 60 However,
U.S. reports complain that even this new legislation fails to address the
inability to provide national treatment and the scope of exclusive rights.6'
Once again, the U.S. urges Mexico to expand its anti-piracy and anticounterfeiting efforts against street piracy and commercial distribution in
all major cities. 62
The U.S. reports fail to make realistic suggestions for
improvement.6 3 Furthermore, such suggestions are not of use to Mexico,
whose piracy numbers continue to climb after 11 years of being a part of
NAFTA regardless of the numerous changes it has made to the Mexican
copyright law. 64 These types of unilateral demands have been made by
the U.S. for years and have proven ineffective.65 If the U.S. is serious
about improving copyright protection in Mexico, it must devise an
alternate solution to aid Mexico in its path to harmonizing its copyright
protection with the other North American nations.
III.

How NAFTA Has Affected Mexican Copyright Laws

A.

GeneralProvisions

As drafted, Chapter 17 of NAFTA, the intellectual property chapter,
was intended to provide "adequate and effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights" to U.S., Mexican and
Canadian nationals "while assuring that measures to enforce intellectual
66
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.,
NAFTA is structured as follows: 1) commands the Member Nations to
put into effect Chapter 17 as well as the terms of four other international
IP treaties; 67 2) specifies that NAFTA is a floor for IP protection, and
60. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report, supra note 54.
61. Id.
62. Id. In order to strengthen its law, the U.S. enumerates that Mexico should
"impose strong criminal penalties and destroy seized products, and increase the speed of
administrative and judicial actions." Additionally, the U.S. urges Mexico to use its
previously adopted organized crime law to stop intellectual property infringements. Id.
63. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report, supra note 54.
64. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, supra note 52.
65. See, e.g., supra note 39.
66. NAFTA, supra note 1.
67. Id. The four international treaties are: 1) The Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonogram, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S. 67; 2) The Berne Convention on
Copyrights, Sept. 9, 1886, 168 Consol. T.S. 185; 3) The Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. 6923, 24 U.S.T.
2140, T.I.A.S. 7727; and 4) either of two Conventions for Protection of new Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force 1968). Id.
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that nations are able to make stronger provisions if they so desire; 68
3) requires that each nation afford copyright owners of other nations
equal protection to the copyright holders of its own nation; 69 4) grants
Member Nations the power to control abusive intellectual property
practices regardless of any provisions of Chapter 17.70 However,
Chapter 17 does not practically address the issue of how a nation like
Mexico is to go about the enforcement of these provisions.
Article 1705 outlines copyright protection and requires that Member
Nations protect all works covered by article 2 of the Berne Convention,7'
that "embody original expression within the meaning of the
convention. ' ' 72 Additionally, article 1705 enumerates the specific
authorization, prohibition, and transfer rights the Member Nations must
grant to copyright holders73 and sets a minimum term for which the
copyright must last.74
Generally, Chapter 17 requires that Member Nations provide
accessible and effective enforcement procedures under national law that
provide for copyright holders to take actions against those who infringe
on their copyright.75 The enforcement provisions require that the
Members authorize the issuance of injunctions 76 and provide for
preliminary injunctions to prevent the entry of allegedly pirated goods
into the marketplace. 77 Furthermore, NAFTA requires damages and
criminal penalties in specific cases. 78 Finally, NAFTA requires border
enforcement of intellectual property
protection so that counterfeit goods
79
may be impounded at customs.
68. Id. art. 1702.
69. Id. art. 1703.
70. Id. art. 1704.
71. The Berne Convention is outside the scope of this comment. It is only necessary
to reference the list of enumerated copyrightable goods in Chapter 17 to understand the
relevant provisions of the Berne Convention for this comment.
72. Id. art. 1705. Article 1705 does not provide an exhaustive list of copyrightable
goods but does specify a number of goods, including computer programs that must be
protected. Id.
73. Id. art. 1705(2)-(3).
74. Id. art. 1705(4). A copyright must last not less than the life of a natural person
plus 50 years. Id.
75. Id. art. 1714. This requirement is not just that the nation provide a method by
which to prosecute but that the remedy must also by expeditious, fair, equitable, not
unreasonably complicated or expensive, and not lengthy or delayed. Problems arise in
clarifying which Nations' systems meet this arbitrary requirement because each Nation
has a system of copyright infringement remedies in place that is intended to meet all of
the above requirements. Id.
76. Id. art. 1715.
77. Id. art. 1716. But see InternationalPropertyEnforcement, supra note 37.
78. Id. arts. 1714, 1717.
79. Id. art. 1718. Article 1718 also provides for a method by which improperly
impounded goods may be retained by the proper owner. Id.
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Specific Remedies and Proceduresfor U.S. Copyright Holders under
NAFTA to Prevent and Cure Mexican CopyrightInfringement

Articles 1714 to 1720 enumerate the enforcement requirements and
remedies available under NAFTA. 80 The general provisions require that
each party provides for civil and administrative proceedings and border
protection under domestic law. 8' Such proceedings must be fair and
equitable, not unreasonably complicated or costly, and may not entail
unreasonable time limits or delay. 82 The parties must also provide
decisions on the merits, which shall if possible be delivered in writing
and preferably state the reasons on which the decisions are based, that
shall be made available to the parties in a proceeding without undue
delay, and such decisions shall be made based upon only the evidence
that was presented in the proceeding.83 In addition, each party must have
a process by which final administrative decisions may be reviewed.84
The section clarifies that no provisions require any party to NAFTA to
create a different legal system for intellectual property protection than
that party uses for the enforcement of their own laws generally.85
Nevertheless, NAFTA does require that each party give its judicial
authorities vast powers 86 to 1) order evidence from the opposing party
when the other party has substantiated a claim that the opposing party
has relevant evidence, 2) make evidentiary decisions when the opposing
party refuses access to evidence, subject to a hearing for the opposing
party on the allegations of evidence, 3) issue an injunction ordering a
party to cease infringement,87 4) order payment from the infringer to the
right holder in an amount adequate to compensate the right holder where
the infringer knew or had reasonable grounds to know, 88 5) order the
80. Id. arts. 1714- 1720.
81. Id. art. 1714.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The requirement that a party must provide an opportunity of review does not
apply in the case of criminal acquittal. Id.
85. Id. However, article 1715 specifies certain processes that must be present in all
judicial proceedings that may be additional to the proceedings that a party normally
requires. Article 1715 requires that defendants have timely written notice with sufficient
detail, parties to a proceeding be allowed to employ independent legal counsel, the
proceedings not require excessive personal appearance requirements, all parties be
permitted to present all relevant evidence and to substantiate their claim, the proceedings
have a means by which to identify and protect confidential information. Id. art. 1715.
86. Id. This requirement would seem to contradict article 1714 of NAFTA. See id.
art. 1714.

87. Id. art. 1715. This right may not be enforced unless the person(s) had reason to
know before using the good that such behavior would be in violation of an intellectual
property right. Id.
88. Id. This right may be extended even when the infringer did not know or had no
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infringer to pay the right holder's expenses, including attorney's fees,
and 6) order payment for expenses to a party improperly enjoined or
restrained in a proceeding. 89 In addition, a party's judicial authorities
must be given authority to deter intellectual property infringement
through orders to dispose of pirated goods outside the channels of
commerce in a manner which avoids harm to the copyright holder or
orders to destroy the goods. 90
Furthermore, the materials and
instruments used predominantly for the pirating industry must also be
disposed of outside the channels of commerce in a manner that would
minimize future risks of infringements. 91
Although the provisions of Chapter 17 provide various enforcement
means and statutory requirements of copyright protection, NAFTA has
permitted Mexico to practically fall short of compliance because it has
established facial compliance. While the principles of NAFTA look
good on the surface, the U.S. continues to struggle as it waits for all
nations to be in full compliance with NAFTA. As is evidenced by the
copyright problems in Mexico and the loss suffered by the U.S.
economy, just meeting the terms of NAFTA is not sufficient if NAFTA
is to ever meet its goal of creating a free trade environment in North
America.
IV. What the United States Can Do to Aid Mexico in its Fight Against
Pirating Within Mexico: The Formation of a New Trade
Agreement
The U.S. should look outside the smaller problem of copyright
piracy to Mexico's larger reality. Mexico's governmental action in
enforcing copyright protection and all the terms of NAFTA have been
insufficient in large part because Mexico does not have the capital to
92
sustain a government that can be harmonized with the U.S. and Canada.
While it is true that corruption is also a contributing factor to the
enforcement problems in Mexico, it can be concluded that corruption
also stems from financial needs.93 If Mexico's economy could be
boosted long-term, the nation would have the means to implement the
demands the U.S. has made on it; however, the U.S. has taken no real
reasonable grounds to know of the infringement in the case of copyrighted goods and
sound recordings. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. art. 1715(5)(b).
91. Id. The disposal authority is tempered by a clause which provides that the
seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered in addition to the interests of
the parties must be weighed out. Id.
92. See, e.g., Richard E. Neff, Mexican Copyright Protection:Proposalsfor Better
Legislation and Enforcement, 1993 U.S.-MEx. LAW INST. 51, 62.

93.

Id.; see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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strides to aid Mexico in improving its economy. Only when Mexico has
resources to work with can the U.S. realistically expect changes in the
law to happen.
While NAFTA has increased jobs in both the U.S. and Mexico,
NAFTA has failed to provide the million plus jobs needed in Mexico and
failed to breach the wage gap between the U.S. and Mexico. 94 Therefore,
in order to thoroughly aid Mexico, the U.S. must find a way to steadily
stimulate Mexico's economy in order to bring it up to a comparable
level. 95 Nevertheless, the U.S. does not have extra money, or enough
money, to boost Mexico's economy. Based upon the two nations'
resources, the best solution for both countries is that the two nations find
a way in which to open the U.S. border to provide much needed jobs in
such a way that both countries will benefit.
Mexico has an abundant supply of inexpensive laborers,96 while
America has an abundance of employment opportunities that those
already residing in America refuse to work.97 These needs suggest that
the U.S. and Mexico should work together to establish a trade agreement
in which Mexican workers can travel and work in the U.S. as needed,
while the U.S. will be provided with an ample workforce. 98 Mexico's
economy would be boosted as a result, creating more money to be spent
within the economy, less need for pirating as society is more able to
afford copyrighted goods, and a greater financial reserve for the
government to use in enforcing the copyright provisions of NAFTA. The
long- term goal would be to create a free flow of people just as NAFTA
has created a free flow of goods. 99 In essence, such a transition would

94. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, interview by Ray Suarez with Vicente Fox,
Mexican presidential candidate, (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 21, 2000),
www.pbs.otg/newshour/bb/latin-america/jan-juneOO/fox_3-21.html. The average worker
in Mexico makes five dollars a day while the average worker in the United States makes
sixty dollars a day. Id.
95. Mexico does not need as lucrative an economy as the U.S. to have the financing
for reform of its policies. Rather, the goal is only to create a reliable economy with
resources that will continue to bring money into the nation for years to come.
96. Stephen Johnson and Sara J. Fitzgerald, The United States and Mexico: Partners
in Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUND., Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/LatinAmerica/BG 1715.cfm.
97. Id.
98. Id. The article emphasizes that "new workers cannot be produced as rapidly as
corn, semi-conductors, or mobile telephone service when demand rises. They must be
grown and educated over the course of at least sixteen years before they can join the labor
force. Immigration allows new workers to enter the labor force rapidly to fill a variety of
positions in response to rising demand for labor." Id.
99. The NewsHour, supra note 94; Johnson, supra note 96. U.S-Mexico trade has
nearly doubled in the years since NAFTA making Mexico the U.S.'s second largest trade
partner. Id. Trade between the U.S. and Mexico was boosted from $100 million in 1994
to $232 million in 2002. Id.
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bring a market that already exists 00 into a safer, more profitable realm,
and in so doing provide Mexico with the means, both in the private and
public sector, by which to reasonably enforce copyright provisions.0 1
A.

The Measures the U.S. Must Take to Create an Immigration Work
System.
1.

The Present Stage of an Open Border in the U.S.

The U.S. demand for workers and the millions of dollars that
Mexico has to gain from an open border policy are enormous. 10 2 Equally°3
as astounding is NAFTA's failure to create enough jobs within Mexico'
and the number of Mexicans still in need of jobs. 10 4 Between 1994 and
2002, only around twelve percent of those in need of employment were
provided with jobs.'0 5 The problem has been exasperated by the
increasingly low labor costs that foreign competition can offer which has
caused many of Mexico's maquiladora plants to close down. 10 6 The
U.S., on the other hand, has around 1.2 million seasonal jobs on farms
where most Americans choose not to work. 10 7 Mexico would like to
export its unemployed workers which would have created a market08 in
excess of 14.5 million dollars in 2003 had a system been put in place.1

100.

See infra note 104 and accompanying text.

101. DANIEL T. GRISWOLD, CATO INST., WILLING WORKERS: FIXING THE PROBLEM OF
ILLEGAL MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002). Currently the labor

migration from Mexico to the U.S. is plagued with smuggling, document fraud, death at
the border, artificially depressed wages, and threats to civil liberties. Id.
102. Hufbauer, supra note 2, at 13. The U.S. employed 5.5 million illegal and legal
Mexican immigrants in 2003. An estimated 4.5 million illegal immigrants lived in the
U.S. in 2000. Id. at 14. Mexicans represent over half of those illegally residing in the
U.S. GRISWOLD, Supra note 101.
103. ZARSKY, supra note 9.

Between 1994 and 2002, about 630,000 jobs were
created in the manufacturing sector. Id.
104. Id. Around 730,000 new workers entered the Mexican work force each year
between 1994 and 2002. The high numbers are credited to the dislodgment of farmers.
Johnson, supra note 96.
105. Id. The jobs that have been created are generally of poor quality, without
benefits, and pay somewhere around seven to thirteen percent less than what the same
jobs would have paid in 1994. Although Mexican population growth has fallen, the job
creation rate is still below the population rate. Id.
106. Id. In countries like China labor has dropped as low as $0.25 per hour while
Mexico still remains somewhere around $1.75 per hour. This decrease in foreign
manufacturing costs caused Mexico to lose 290,000 jobs by 2003. Id.
107. Id.
108. ROBERTO SURO, REMITTANCE SENDERS AND RECEIVERS: TRACKING THE
TRANSNATIONAL CHANNELS, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND AND THE PEW HISP.
CENTER

17(2003).
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Presently, the U.S. enforces a tight border system'0 9 that has not
stunted immigration, as the U.S. had hoped, but rather has caused
Mexican immigrant workers to enter and stay in the U.S illegally. 110
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Mexican President
Vicente Fox and U.S. President George W. Bush were creating a U.S.Mexico High Level Working Group on Migration with the goal of
matching Mexican workers with willing U.S. employers in order to
President Fox
create a safe migration system for employment."'
proposed an open border throughout North America in order to increase
the availability of the continent's labor supply." 2 After the September
11 attacks all such discussions ceased and border security has tightened,
making President Fox's goal far off. 13 This is not to say that the U.S. is
not giving the issue any attention. Currently there are two bills before
Congress which would, if implemented, sufficiently regulate the
distribution of work visas. 14 However, these bills do not purport to
allow greater numbers of immigrants across the border but rather aim to
have greater control over those already permitted in the country in order
to offer them greater mobility with supervision."'
2.

The First U.S. Steps to Creating an Open Border.

The U.S. must establish a more easily facilitated system for issuing
immigrant temporary working visas to identify those entering the U.S.
only for temporary employment so that immigrant workers will be
109. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 2. The U.S. currently has in place a protectionist
system known as "Operation Hold the Line" which extends from El Paso into New
Mexico. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 4-5. Because of the dangerous conditions and prices involved in crossing
the border, Mexican immigrants are remaining in the United States longer to avoid such
harsh conditions and prices on the return trip. Id. at 6-7.
111. Johnson, supra note 96; Press Release, White House, Joint Statement Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States (Sept. 6, 2001) at
Although the
http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2001/09/20010906-8.html.
September 11 attacks halted U.S. immigration reform, it has remained a centerpiece of
Mexico's foreign policy reform. Johnson, supra note 96.
112. Id. Such a North American workforce will not be possible so long as Mexico is
infested with monopolies, corrupt practices, uneducated workers, and insufficient law
enforcement provisions. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act (H.R. 2899) and the
Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits and Security Act (H.R.3142) have both been
introduced with the goals of ensuring that employers first seek out U.S. workers, allowing
tracking of current visa holders upon switching from one employer to another so that all
time working will be credited towards residency, receiving taxes from the visa holder for
the work performed only to be transferred to Mexico's social security system upon
departure, preventing welfare payments from being given to the visa holders, and creating
a U.S.-Mexico database that will provide information regarding temporary positions. Id.
115. Id.
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permitted to cross the border, while prohibiting indefinite stays."H6 This
will require greater enforcement efforts by the U.S. both on the border to
monitor entrance, and within the nation to ensure that U.S. farmers who
employ immigrant workers go through the necessary filing
requirements. 1 7 These homeland enforcement officials would be
responsible for the tracking of those who have entered on temporary
visas to decrease the number of illegal immigrants in the U.S. who
overstay after entering legally on temporary visas." 18 Conversely, the
increase of personnel on the border would serve to create more entry
points in order to protect as well as expedite routine crossings for
commuter and businesses." 9 All of these efforts would be made with a
goal to have an open exchange of people in the same manner as there is a
free flow of goods presently. 2 ° However, these efforts will not be
successful if the U.S. does not receive support from the Mexican
government which also must make necessary121 political, economic, and
security reforms to effectuate an open market.
B.

How Mexico Can Aid the U.S. in the Monitoringof an Open Border

Although it seems clear that a plan by the U.S. that would bolster
Mexico's economy from the inside would be an effective and innovative
way for the U.S. to aid Mexico while receiving some of the long sought
after reforms, Mexico still must resolve some issues on its own to ensure
that the open border would be more of an assistance to the U.S. than a
nuisance. For instance, Mexico must deal internally with its tumultuous
political structure,122 the monopolistic aristocracy that still controls much
of Mexico's economy, 23 and the security institutions of Mexico that
continue to lag behind the other North American nations as a result of
corruption. 24 Additionally, the two nations should create a new treaty
116. Id.
117. Id. Although the number of temporary visas is unrestricted, only a minority of
U.S. farmers as well as immigrant workers, follow the established procedures. Id.
118. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 5. Around one in six illegal immigrants first
entered the United States legally but then stayed illegally past the allotted time period.
Id.
119. Johnson, supra note 96.
120. The NewsHour, supra note 94.
121. Johnson, supra note 96.
122. Id. In 2000, President Fox was the first president elected not from the
Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in over 70 years, as a result of political reforms
that led to fair elections; however, the PRI still remains a strong enough force in the
legislature in conjunction with another opposition party to veto President Fox's agenda.
Moreover, the majority of candidates are still selected by party leaders which effectively
prohibits people "off the street" from running for office. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Mexican officials earn between $200-$500 per month and some still accept
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that would outline Mexico's goals to use the economic benefits that flow
from the open border primarily for bringing Mexico into true compliance
with the terms of NAFTA.
Although President Fox has proposed an overhaul of the political
structure of Mexico, the suggestions need to be followed through in order
to ensure a collaborative effort. 125 President Fox's weak support in the
Mexican Congress, however, suggests that it may be some time until
such proposals are brought into law. 126 His suggestions include the
127
curbing of corruption by citizen checks and balances at all levels.
These goals would be facilitated by the opening of primaries to all
citizens who would like to run for office and by linking representatives
with specific districts that would hold them accountable. 128 In addition,
the power to collect taxes and control local services would be delegated
to the local jurisdictions. 129 Through these changes, Mexico would not
only lessen its own corruption but would also bring Mexico into a more
compatible state with the government of the U.S.
Additionally, Mexico must commit to assisting the U.S. in border
security. 130 If the Mexican government is as eager to work with the U.S.
as it claims to be to create an immigration work program, then it too
must assist in the implementation of the program. 131 A good starting
point for the two nations would be the regular holding of joint training
conferences for enforcement officers. 132 This would require Mexico to
assign additional enforcement officers to the border.13 Through these
programs, common standards by which to regulate immigration would be
created. 134
Additionally, Mexico needs to focus on putting an end to elitist
monopolies. Mexico must attempt to terminate such monopolies by
extending credit for small Mexican businesses at comparable rates to the

bribes in order to supplement their income. Many judicial procedures in Mexico still
remain inconsistent with American law such as torture-induced confessions. Id.
125. Id.
126. Hufbauer, supranote 2, at 20.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 21.
132. Johnson, supra note 96. The U.S. and Canada already conduct such joint
training programs. Mexico is already a part of counter-narcotics training with Canada
and the U.S. Id.
133. Although the use of enforcement resources for the border would initially mean
decreased security in other areas of regulation, the primary focus should be on
jumpstarting Mexico's economy, and after that occurs, the U.S. can realistically demand
a change in policy as agreed to under the terms of NAFTA.
134. Id.
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U.S. and Canada and by expediting the licensing process. 135
Furthermore, Mexico must work on education reform so that workers
will have opportunities beyond agriculture. 136 Mexico needs to focus on
job creation internally as much as the U.S. will focus on job placement
within its borders in order to ensure that the Nation will have an adequate
job supply.
In exchange for the increased revenue that Mexico will gain as a
result of an opening of the border, the U.S. should demand of Mexico
that the money be used in the enforcement of regulations that will bring
it into compliance with NAFTA, in particular, with Chapter 17 of
NAFTA. The millions of dollars that the U.S. will be giving to the
individuals of Mexico that will flow into the economy should more than
compensate for a Mexican rejuvenation of efforts to halt copyright
infringement; moreover, the U.S. will be spared the millions of dollars
lost each year as a result of copyright infringement.
C. Why Has the U.S. Failedto Create an Open Border Previously?
Other than the obvious security fears created by the September 11
attacks, U.S. officials as well as the general population have many fears
regarding the opening of the U.S.-Mexico border. The biggest concerns
are that an open border would create a new flood of immigrants into the
nation that it would be unable to support, cause a lack of jobs for lowskilled Americans, establish a new lower class that will forever be unable
to assimilate, and negate security measures already taken to protect the
nation. 1 37 Although each of these concerns has some legitimacy and
must be monitored, 138 none of these outweigh the benefits previously
discussed. 139
The first concern of an open border stems from the idea that the
lowered costs and lowered risks will encourage hordes of Mexicans that
would otherwise not cross the border to do so.' 40 However, those same
improved conditions that will encourage migration will likely encourage
others already in the U.S. to return home to Mexico and permit those
who enter to work to only stay so long as work exists.' 41 For the same

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 11.
138. Id. Each of these concerns has been either embellished or misconstrued. Id.
139. See SURo, supra note 108.
140. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 11.
141. Id. In other words, the "circular pattern of migration" that existed prior to the
border crackdown in the mid and late 1980s would be reinstated. If given the choice,
Mexican workers would rather return to their families and homeland then stay in the U.S.
indefinitely. Id.
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reason, it is not likely that the migrant workers would go through the cost
and trouble of moving their entire family north for a seasonal job when
they know they can return safely. 142 In other words, this argument fails
to recognize that immigration numbers directly correspond with labor
needs. 143 Finally, both the decreasing birth rate in Mexico and the
increased creation of jobs within Mexico will lower the number of
144
immigrants seeking work in the years ahead.
The second concern, regarding the displacement and lowering of
wages of low-skilled Americans, incorrectly blames immigrants for
depressed wages. 145 In reality, immigrant workers motivate high-school
dropouts to complete their education as a result of this perceived
competition for jobs. 146 Furthermore, more education and skills are the
logical solution for American high school drop-outs and not heavier
restrictions on willing migrant laborers who do not have the same labor
147
opportunities afforded to them in their country.
Yet another concern is the burden imposed on taxpayers by migrant
workers stemming from a fear of an increase in the costs of welfare,
schooling, and healthcare. 148 It is irrefutable that immigrant workers tend
to pay less in taxes and use governmental assistance programs more than
the average American household; however, it is a misstatement that
immigrants are heavy users of welfare. 149 This concern also fails to take
into account the 1996 amendments to the U.S. welfare law specifically
aimed at keeping immigrants from receiving welfare. 150
1997
calculations, regarding the net fiscal impact of immigrants, show that the
average immigrant and his descendants pay more in taxes than they
142. Id. Under a prior, more open border regulatory scheme, the rate of return to
Mexico was high. Id.
143. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 12. During the 2001 recession in the U.S., the
number of Mexican immigrants dropped to an estimated half the level of the year before.
Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 13. Between 1980 and 1994, the increase in immigration caused a five
percent drop in the wages of American workers without high school diplomas.
International trade and technological improvements are thought to be the other major
factors that continue to cause a decrease in wages. Id.
146. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 13. This fact is evidenced by the spike in high
school graduates between 1910 and 1930, the time period commonly referred to as the
last "Great Migration."
See Rodney Ramacharan, Migration and Human Capital
Formation: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. High School Movement, 2002 INT'L
MONETARY FUND 3.

147.

GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 13.

148. Id.
149. Id. Mexican immigrants come to the U.S. to work, not to collect welfare. This
is a result of a higher number of two- parent households and labor force participation by
immigrant workers than native born workers. Id. at 13-14.
150. Id. at 14. The legislation caused a decline in low- income immigrant families
with children by more than half between 1994 and 1999. Id.
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receive in services. 15 1 However, immigrant workers, without high school
educations, cost the U.S. somewhere around $13,000 over their
lifespan. 52 Continuing reforms in the welfare law will further reduce
this dollar amount as well as future generations of educated, higher paid
immigrants. 153 Moreover, the benefits gained by the U.S. in having
laborers at lower costs offsets these temporary costs
sufficient supplies of
54
1
government.
the
to
A fourth concern is that an increase in immigration will create a
permanent lower class. 155 Mexicans have migrated in high volumes in
the last two decades, but these numbers are not unprecedented in relation
to the American population. 156 The U.S. has always been able to absorb
large numbers of immigrants as immigrants disperse throughout the
nation and learn the English language. 157 Moreover, surveys continue to
show that the attitude of Mexican immigrants is largely one of pride and
158
appreciation for the freedoms and opportunities within the nation.
of a "seething underclass" that is unable to adapt is
This fear 159
misplaced.
One final concern is that allowing migrant workers into the nation
compromises U.S. security. Mexican immigration and security concerns
are not as closely linked as many believe. 160 The U.S. government
recognizes this fact and none of the legislation drafted to heighten
Furthermore, the
security has addressed Mexican migration. 161
legalization of Mexican migration would only act to increase security
because it would free up resources to monitor terrorist activity 162 and
would encourage large numbers of immigrants entering the country to

GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 14.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.at 14- 15.
155. Id. at 15. Mexican immigrants tend to retain ties to their homeland and insulate
their communities within the U.S; therefore, Mexicans tend to assimilate more slowly
than other immigrants. Id.
156. GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 15. In the 1990s, 1.5 Mexican immigrants per
every 1,000 U.S. residents entered this country while in the years between 1841 to 1860,
the U.S. received 3.6 Irish immigrants per year per every 1,000 U.S. residents. Id.
157. Id. at 15-16. Studies show that Hispanics are dispersing faster across the country
than any migrating group previously has and that only three percent of Mexican
immigrants speak English poorly or not at all. Id. at 16.
158. Id. at 17.

151.

159.

GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 17.

160. Id. For starters, the September 11 attacks were neither linked
linked to temporary working visas like those that would be provided
border system. Canada has been the preferred point of entry for terrorists.
161. Id. at 18.
162. Id. An estimated three billion dollars is spent on monitoring the
of Mexican workers each year. Id.

to Mexico nor
under an open
Id. 17- 18.
illegal entrance
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register with the government so that they may be more easily
monitored. 63 Although it is a valid concern in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, a relationship between Mexican migration and
terrorism is attenuated at best. 164
Each of these concerns will be dealt with over time as the U.S.
government adapts to the changes. Some of these concerns will likely
never even become an issue. And all of these concerns will be
substantially outweighed by the benefits the U.S. will receive from the
workforce and the improvements that the U.S. will see as a result of
Mexico's improved economy, so long as Mexico agrees to use this
financing for compliance efforts.
V.

Conclusion

Although NAFTA has been in place for over a decade, 165 the U.S.
continues to struggle with many of Mexico's policies as a result of a lack
of enforcement. 166 One such issue that costs the U.S. millions of dollars
every year is copyright infringement. 167 Since it has become clear that
the mere presence of NAFTA and the threat of sanctions are insufficient
to bring Mexico into compliance with many parts of NAFTA,168 and
since it is increasingly clear that Mexico's biggest concern is
financing, 169 the U.S. needs to make a change in its own policies and
negotiate a new trade agreement if it ever wishes to see a change. By
looking specifically at the issue of copyright protection, this comment
has sought to establish an alternative approach for aiding Mexico by
which the U.S. will ultimately see a greater change in Mexican policy.
Mexico has made vast changes to its copyright law in order to come
into compliance with NAFTA and has continued to make further changes
to satisfy the two northern Members of NAFTA. Moreover, Mexico has
facially taken the preliminary steps to come into compliance with
NAFTA. 170 However, such superficial changes have done little to
harmonize Mexico's laws in practice. 7 ' While the U.S. has issued
warnings and given Mexico recommendations, 72 it has never done
anything to actually change the situation. As can be seen in the case of
163.
164.
165.
166.

GRISWOLD, supra note 101, at 18.
Id. at 17.
NAFTA, supra note 1.
Hufbauer, supra note 2, at 8.

167.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY,

and accompanying text.
168. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report, supra note 54.
169. Associated Press, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
170. 1997 Federal Law, supra note 7.
171. Hufbauer, supra note 2, at 8.
172. U.S. Trade Rep. Special 301 Report, supra note 54.
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copyright piracy, Mexico continues to allow large amounts of piracy
because it cannot afford greater protection of an industry that does not
benefit its economy; furthermore, the vast majority of Mexicans cannot
afford copyrighted goods.1 73 If the U.S. would agree to President Fox's
requests 174 and open the borders to maximize the profitability of an
industry that already exists, with an agreement established that in
exchange for the market creation Mexico will use the increase in
revenues to crack down on the pirating of music, the U.S.'s
copyrightable goods as well as the nation's labor force would benefit.
As the economic situation continues to improve, so too could the U.S.
continue to make suggestions that Mexico would actually have the means
to implement. Furthermore, NAFTA would finally become the great free
trade agreement that it was drafted to be.

173. Lannert, supra note 20. As a Mexican distributor bluntly explained, "[Mexican]
people cannot afford nonpirated product, and the record labels have raised their prices,
thereby directly supporting it."
174. The NewsHour, supra note 94.

